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A CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVE
MARK TUSHNET*

In this comment I want to address two points suggested by Professor
Finnis's essay "Natural Law and Legal Reasoning." I say "suggested by"
deliberately, for I do not want to attribute the points in their full force
to him, although I believe that his essay lends itself to a reading in which
those points would be given their full force. The points deal with the
question of "easy questions" and what Professor Finnis calls the "sufficient and necessarily artificial clarity and definiteness" that yields answers to such questions, and with the way in which legal professionals
are likely to understand the "theory of practical reasoning" to which
Professor Finnis is committed. In discussing these points I will move back
and forth between what I have elsewhere called the sociological and the
philosophical strands in critical legal studies.' At the conclusion of the
comment I will note briefly some of my disquiets about the enterprise of
the comment itself.
I. EASY QUESTIONS

A typical response to the CLS claim of indeterminacy is to point out
that lawyers certainly, and lay people in some cases, have the experience
of confronting and resolving easy cases. 2 In discussing easy questions,
Professor Finnis uses the term "algorithm," which I believe is symptomatic of the images that the "easy questions" response trades upon. That
is, we know that there are easy questions because we know that there
are legal rules that use mathematical terms which are, at least for all
practical purposes, 3 completely determinate-the periods identified in
statutes of limitations, for example, or the various mathematical provisions in the United States Constitution. Further, though this point is less

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., Harvard College;
M.A., Yale University; J.D., Yale Law School. I want to thank Anita Allen and
the participants in the Cleveland State conference for their comments on a draft
of this essay.
I Tushnet, Some Current Controversies in Critical Legal Studies, in CRITICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT: A GERMAN-AMERICAN DEBATE (C.Joerges & D.Trubek eds. 1989).
I should note that I no longer think it correct, and am inclined to think it unhelpful, to distinguish between these two strands except for purposes of a certain
kind of exposition (fortunately, the kind exemplified by this comment). My concern
is that the distinction may, to use a favorite CLS term, reify the disciplines of
sociology and philosophy rather than, as most people associated with CLS would
prefer, dissolve the disciplinary distinction altogether.
IIn addition to Finnis's comments, which are of course not directed, at least
explicitly, at the CLS claims about indeterminacy, see Schauer, Easy Cases, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985), which has become probably the standard citation for
the point.
II mean by this to put aside Wittgensteinian-or Kripkean -worries about
the understandability of mathematical terms.
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often made, it is trivially easy to posit a legal rule that is also completely
determinate: "Plaintiffs always win" or "Litigants named Tushnet always
lose."4
If the existence of this sort of easy question refuted the CLS claim of
indeterminacy, one might wonder how people with law degrees from respectable universities could ever have offered the indeterminacy claim.
And, because it is generally conceded that at least some CLS adherents,
if perhaps deeply wrong-headed, are at least not incredibly stupid, there
has to be something wrong with the use of this sort of example to refute
the CLS indeterminacy claim. I will suggest several candidates for what
is wrong.
First, the examples provide what we might call "existence proofs" of
the possibility of determinacy, or simple counterexamples. If, however,
the CLS indeterminacy claim was not that there was never and never
could be a determinate legal rule, an existence proof or a counterexample
does not refute the claim. When I have stated the indeterminacy claim,
I have used terms like "interesting" to qualify the claim, as in, "No
interesting legal propositions are determinate." I have recognized, of
course, that that and cognate formulations must place a lot of weight on
the term "interesting" or substitutes therefore, and I will discuss the
kinds of weight later in this section. For now, however, the point is simply
that identifying some linguistically determinate rule' need not refute the
indeterminacy claim properly understood.
This point may be put somewhat differently. Imagine that we had a
metric by which the determinacy of words or legal rules could be measured; call each unit a "determinile," and assume that a completely indeterminate rule measures zero on the scale, while a fully determinate
one measures 100 determiniles. I suggest that most legal academics in
the United States would say that the general measure of determinacy is
around 40 to 60 determiniles; that is, overall, legal rules are not completely determinate but they are not completely indeterminate either.
The CLS claim, I suggest, is that the measure of indeterminacy is about
15 to 5 determiniles. There is a gap between the CLS understanding of
the degree of indeterminacy and the mainstream understanding, but no
one on either side claims that the positions are at the polar extremes. On
this view, an existence proof or counterexample might show only that we
have identified a rule that falls into the 5-15 determiniles range that,
even CLS people agree, includes determinate rules.
Second, it seems to me significant that the core examples of determinate
legal rules invoke mathematical terms. This can show, at most, that the
domains of law and of mathematics-or other equivalently determinate
ways of speaking-sometimes come into contact, or, to adopt another
mathematical metaphor, that the two domains overlap to some degree as
For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 13-15.
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

sSee, e.g., M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE:
STITUTIONAL LAW 52 (1988).

OF CON-

'Again subject to Kripkean worries.
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in some Venn diagrams. It does not show that the entire domain of law
is just like the domain of mathematics. Again, if the CLS claim of indeterminacy is limited to some sub-set of possible legal propositions, such
as "interesting ones," the existence of points of contact between law and
determinate domains, or the existence of some degree of overlap, does not
refute the CLS claim, at least if the points of contact are not so numerous
or the amount of overlap is not so great as to make the CLS claim uninteresting. But, precisely because the examples of determinacy tend to
be mathematical or otherwise tangential to what really happens in law,
contact are numerous enough to weigh heavily
I doubt that the points of
7
against the CLS claim.

Third, we should consider what actually happens in law when statutes
8
of limitations are involved. There are disputes over whether to count
Sundays for purposes of statutes of limitations, which actually are disputes over what a number used in a legal rule really means. I do not
want to make too much of these disputes, though, because there are more
over
important examples for my purposes. There are two typical disputes
9
statutes of limitations: (1) From what date does the statute run, and (2)
Which of several possible statutes of limitations should apply in the circumstances. 10 That is, the existence of a fully determinate provision arguably applicable to the situation at hand does not mean that the actual
resolution of the problem is determinate.
I would like to identify the reason for that as a fourth response to the
"easy questions" claim, though it probably is not an independent reason.
In the dispute between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller over the problems of
the core and penumbra of legal propositions, Fuller pointed out that legal
propositions typically do not turn on the interpretation of single words,
1
but on "a sentence, a paragraph, or a whole page or more of text."' For
present purposes, I want to take this as pointing out, correctly, that
individual legal propositions-that the statute of limitations is four
years-are embedded in a complex domain including many other relevant
legal propositions, and that the resolution of any particular legal problem
turns not on the meaning of any individual proposition but on the mean, For an interesting though I believe almost completely wrong-headed extended
discussion claiming-in the terms used here-that the points of contact are indeed

quite substantial, see Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning,
and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989).
8In working through the example of the constitutional requirement that the
President be over 35 and a native-born citizen, I have suggested that were there
sufficient political pressure to elect a 32-year-old President or to elect Henry
Kissinger President, lawyers would start to make arguments, which would start
to sound credible, about these rules. My view is that it is only because no one
has a present interest in making those arguments that they sound implausible
when they are devised to meet the purported counterexamples the constitutional
provisions are taken to provide. For additional discussion of this point, see infra
note 15 accompanying text.
9

See, e.g., Lorance v. American Tel. & Tel., 109 S.Ct. 2261 (1989).
e.g., Owens v. Okure, 109 S.Ct. 573 (1989).
11Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Response to Professor Hart, 71
HARv. L. REV. 630, 663 (1958).
10 See,
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ing of all the propositions, all at once. 12 If that is so, an "existence proof'
that includes a single legal proposition establishes nothing at all.' 3
Consider again the determinate rule that plaintiffs always win. I know
of no legal system that incorporates such a rule, and there is a reason
for that, I suspect. Such a rule would be felt to be intolerable in any
system that held itself out to be a legal system. Similarly with the rule
about plaintiffs named Tushnet. In the legal system of the United States,
such a rule would almost certainly be unconstitutional as a violation of
notions of equal protection, 14 and I suspect that similar notions can be
found in any system that holds itself out as a legal system.
There are some points at which the preceding discussion is vulnerable,
though I believe that the weaknesses are not serious. I have assumed
that the legal domain includes many other relevant legal propositions.
It could be that, with respect to some interesting purportedly determinate
rule, the domain includes only a few relevant legal propositions. If so,
the domain itself may be sufficiently determinate to defeat the CLS claim;
the determinile measure may get up to 40 or 50. What is crucial here, of
course, is the specification of criteria of relevancy to restrict the domain
of relevant propositions. Yet, it seems to me the mark of a talented lawyer
to devise arguments that demonstrate the arguable relevance of rules
that a less talented lawyer would think irrelevant at the outset. Coming
up with creative analogies is, after all, an important part of what lawyers
do. If one incorporates this notion of lawyering into the definition of the
legal system, it is unlikely that the legal system taken as a whole would
be sufficiently determinate to defeat the CLS claim of indeterminacy.
I believe it will be helpful now to return to the other examples of
determinate rules, like "Plaintiffs always lose," which will allow us to
consider what makes a legal proposition "interesting."'' 5 Let us suppose,
though, that for some reason or other, the relevant law-makers happen
to declare such a rule as law. What would happen? At first, of course, the
rule being obviously determinate would be applied across the board, producing results that people would generally agree were unjust. At that
point, the rule might be repealed, which would give us no interesting
analytical insights. Alternatively, though, the rule might be "interpreted"
to avoid manifest injustice. I would think that the techniques for such a
reinterpretation would be apparent to well-trained lawyers. It would be-

12 1 put it in this strong form, which I believe correct, but my basic point would
hold were the statement in the text to be modified to say "all relevant-or nearby propositions."
13For an example, using one of the mathematical propositions of the Constitution, see M. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 61-62.
141 put it in this way to elide the differences, if any, between the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the ideas of equal protection that
the Supreme Court has held are present in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.
16 For a discussion of why such rules do not appear in real legal systems, see

supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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gin to happen that people who filed certain kinds of claims would be
described, not as "plaintiffs" subject to the determinate rule, but as, for
example, "claimants" or "victims." And because the rule does not say that
claimants always lose, injustice could be avoided.
(I do not think that this example is entirely fanciful, though because
the postulated determinate rule is fanciful, I suppose I am entitled to
some fancy in my response. The implausibility of the response is generated
by the implausibility of the initial hypothetical, not by a weakness in the
underlying argument about indeterminacy. Further, I suggest that something like it characterizes the development of legal rules in systems where
there are competing legal jurisdictions. If a person is excluded from one,
or is likely to lose in one, because of a determinate rule applied in that
jurisdiction, he or she will go to the other and argue that the preferred
system has jurisdiction.)
This discussion suggests that we might think of "interesting legal questions," that is, those to which the CLS indeterminacy claim applies, as
those that are likely to generate real disputes. In an important way, this
definition of the scope of the CLS indeterminacy claim converges with
Finnis's concern with practical reason, but in doing so it shows why the
existence of easy questions is basically irrelevant to the more important
matters bound up with the idea of practical reason. As Finnis says, "practical reasoning moves from reasons for action to choices (and actions)
16
guided by those reasons."' This suggests, as Alisdair Macintyre has said
specifically, that practical reason comes into play only where there is a
choice to be made,'17 that is, where one wonders about the possible reasons
for competing choices or courses of action. Easy questions are, precisely,
those as to which there appear to be no competing choices. Yet, if, as
Finnis also says, "legal reasoning is, broadly speaking, practical reasoning," it would appear that the existence of easy questions has nothing to
do with legal reasoning."8
This conclusion, though, may be too abrupt. For one thing, it is reasonably clear that what one group of people regard at one point as an
easy question, another group, or the same group at some other time, might
9
see as not so easy after all.' If what are easy questions change over time
or across groups, it is reasonably clear that "easiness" is not a property
of words alone, but is a property of words in particular communities under
particular circumstances. It is reasonably clear as well that questions
once easy become more difficult when some social group with sufficient
political power finds that its interests would be promoted were the question to become controverted, that is, to become an occasion for demanding
reasons for choices and courses of action-in the usual instance, I believe,
ilFinnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1 (1990).
17A. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE, WHAT RATIONALITY 54 (1988).

18It should be noted, too, that in this version there is nothing about legal
reasoning.
reasoning that sets it apart from other forms of practical once
hotly contested, of
191 have elsewhere used the example of the question,
whether West Virginia was legally created and therefore entitled to two Senators.
M. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 69 n.153.
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an occasion for demanding reasons for the maintenance of the existing
social order. To put the point in a somewhat different way, selecting among
competing alternatives, which is what practical reasoning consists in,
involves selecting a course of action that will bring us acceptably close
to our goal. Yet, the criteria for determining what will count as acceptably
close are socially constructed.
This is not to say, of course, that once the questions become the occasions
for contention that new answers will be given, or rather, that new arrangements will be devised. In one sense, there cannot be "new" answers
at all, for the easiness of easy questions is precisely that no one thinks
that they have to be answered, or indeed that they are questions. My
hypothesis, though, is that the fact that people ask for answers where
once they needed none is a signal of a shift in underlying political forces.
If that hypothesis is correct, however, it has implications for our understanding of practical reasoning as well. I have been arguing, in essence, that the CLS claim of indeterminacy stands up to the "easy
questions" challenge because that challenge does not address the problems of practical reasoning that characterize, or define, legal reasoning.
Yet, if the category of "easy questions" is itself defined with reference to
underlying political forces, there would seem to be some overlap between
politics and the concept of practical reasoning as well. 20 Even if there is
no such conceptual overlap, however, I am reasonably sure that there is
a practical overlap, to which I now turn.
II. PRACTICAL REASONING IN LAWYERS' DISCOURSE
The terms "practical reason" and phronesis have come into the vocab-

ulary of constitutional lawyers in the United States in recent years.21 I
do not want to saddle Finnis directly with the misuses of those terms in
that vocabulary, but I do want to suggest some sociological dimensions
that deserve some attention.
At least in the United States, legal theory is parasitic upon developments in other domains of normative and descriptive social theory. "Practical reason" is in some ways just another essentially ignorant
appropriation by lawyers of concepts from other domains, where they
have a well-developed background and literature, to be imported to solve
problems the lawyers have discovered in their own domain. As used by
academic lawyers in the United States, practical reason seems to mean
the good common sense of the well-socialized lawyer. To the extent that
the general concept of practical reason draws upon the idea that people
engaged in some practical activity on a regular basis become adept at

201 take it to be uncontroversial that there are overlaps between practical
reasoning and the substance of political decisions.
21 For a discussion, convergent with mine, that cites sources, see Feinman,
PracticalLegal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REv. 724 (1988).
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determining the right way to conduct that activity, the American usage
is at least in the ballpark of ideas that might circle around the proper
concept of practical reason. 2
Once we think about how lawyers are socialized, though, we might
have some misgivings about placing much normative weight upon the
conclusions they draw-or, if that suggests too rationalistic a process, the
solutions they arrive at-in the course of their practical activity. I would
begin my analysis by identifying one fact and one myth. The fact is that
the social composition of the lawyering class, including lawyers presently
in practice and those developing the practical skills that will enable them
to become lawyers, is markedly skewed. The myth is that the practical
reasoning abilities of lawyers are deployed in helping people resolve their
problems of daily life, whereas those abilities are in fact deployed, at least
in the reaches of the United States legal profession that define what good
legal practice is, on behalf of large organizations attempting to navigate
through the shoals of the modern regulatory state. 3
The social origins of the lawyering class are likely to affect what the
profession regards as sound common sense in an obvious way. On ordinary
assumptions about human motivation, cynically overstated as "who pays
the piper calls the tune," we are likely to find it extraordinarily difficult
to distinguish between the socialized sound common sense of the profession and the interests of the lawyering class and those for whom it labors.
Sound common sense is likely, therefore, to be shaped by the interests of
those holding power, either because they are like the lawyers or because
they employ the lawyers.
Perhaps, we might think, the process of socialization into the lawyering
class would moderate the class origins and affiliations of lawyers. I suspect
that that is true, but would emphasize the word "moderate." The sound
common sense of the profession might be somewhat more restrained than
the unbridled desires of the powerful clientele. In its organized expressions, the legal profession in the United States is today probably somewhat more reasonable than its clientele, though the notion of corporate
responsibility has penetrated the corporate elite as well.2 4 Yet, it is worth
pointing out that the organized expressions of the bar in the United States
have almost since the beginning been replete with high-sounding language that is substantially at odds with what the very people uttering
the words were doing in their capacity as lawyers acting on behalf of
22For the kind of use of the concept to which I refer, see Burton, Law as Practical
Reason, 62 S.CAL. L. REv. 747 (1989). Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARv. L. REV. 829, 849-55 (1990), offers a more sophisticated treatment, and a
reference to the United States literature at 850 n.79, but her treatment is, in my
view, subject to weaker versions of the criticisms I offer in the text.
?3I limit my observations to the United States profession because I am not
familiar enough with the profession elsewhere to be nearly as confident about
my judgments with respect to the bar elsewhere as I am with respect to the United
States bar.
I suppose, though, that defenders of the notion of practical reason would see
that as the penetration of practical reason with respect to corporate activities
into the corporate elite.
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clients.25 And, there is a structural reason to believe that lawyers will
not find it to be an important component of common sense to stand against
the interests of the powerful. One of the practical skills that lawyers
develop is deferring to-or catering to-those in power, in order to get
them to use their power on behalf of the lawyer's clients. The very structure of the profession, without regard to its class composition, thus places
26
limits on what the profession is likely to regard as sound common sense.
The myth of service to individuals enhances limitations on the profession's sense of what is sound common sense. The myth is an ideology in
Mannheim's classic sense, a story about how people live their lives that
allows them to engage in behavior that, in the absence of such a story,
they might find normatively troubling. If lawyers are socialized into believing that they are members of a "helping profession," they are likely
to think that the judgments they arrive at are compassionate in the
aggregate, even if individual judgments, when viewed by outsiders to the
profession, might seem unfeeling. Of course, many individual lawyers,
perhaps most of them, actually do help real people get on with their lives.
Yet, those who define the profession's aspirations-by becoming leaders
of the bar or by instructing budding lawyers at leading law schools-do
most of their work on behalf of large organizations rather than on behalf
of individuals.2 7 No doubt the myth of service is comforting, but to the
extent that it underpins the profession's sense that its common sense
embodies norms that are in an important way independent of the interests
of the powerful, it provides another of the supports for a notion of sound
common sense that almost certainly cannot bear much normative weight.
At this point it seems to me appropriate to engage in a modest ad
hominem discussion of another of Finnis's works, his treatment of the
strategy of nuclear deterrence. 28 That discussion has a number of targets,
25 The basic work on this topic is Robert Gordon's ongoing study of the elite
New York bar in the nineteenth century. For some soundings of his findings, see

Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of New
York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, at 51, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POSTCiViL
26 WAR AMERICA (G. Gawalt ed. 1984)
The phenomenon is not confined to lawyers for the corporate elite. It is part
of the strategy of civil rights claimants, for example, to explain to a person in
power that that person's interest would be served by something that initially
appears to be contrary to that person's interest. For one version of this point, see
Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
271 rely here on the analysis of J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982), who describe the structure of the
Chicago bar with reference to whether lawyers graduated from local or national
law schools. Local law schools, which probably are most of them, educate lawyers
who will indeed provide services to individual clients, including divorces, will
writing, small business counselling, and the like. The national law schools, in
contrast, educate lawyers who will provide services to larger organizations, be
they corporations or the national government. It is the latter group that primarily
influences the development of the ideology of the profession.
21 J. FINNIS, J. BOYLE, & G. GRiSEZ, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM (1987). I am reasonably confident that most of the specific matters I cite
were not initially drafted by Finnis, but he of course would properly take responsibility for them.
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but its primary focus is on the immorality, according to what Finnis and
his co-authors call the tradition of common morality, of the strategy of
nuclear deterrence because it takes as one of its defining aims the deliberate killing of innocents. In setting up their discussion, Finnis and his
co-authors include a chapter on the duty to deter Soviet advances. That
chapter counterposes "Western culture and political life" to "the Leninist
political order," to the obvious advantage of the former:
"Soviet rulers vary in the scale and intensity of their crimes, but their
ideology has an inherent disrespect for the dignity of individual persons,
who can be sacrificed whenever expedient to promote the Marxist utopia. '29 Further, were the Soviets "not opposed," the consequence would
probably be the loss of the independence of the West and therefore "great
damage to the goods which are protected by Western political and constitutional order.."3 0 This is because

there is in Soviet ideology and politics a dynamic towards unsettling the world order and expanding the influence, the hegemony, or even the direct rule of the Soviets. The domination
and absorption of the Baltic nations, the fraudulent and forcible
repression of the nations of Eastern Europe, and the continual
efforts to support Marxist revolution around the world, belong
to a pattern of foreign policy....

31

In addition, "nations whose military power is great and is not seriously
opposed are likely to use their power to get their way whenever confronted
by other nations. '32 Further, the Soviet Union cannot be understood as
having simply reacted to "perceived threats by the West,"3 3 because that
"can hardly account for the whole policy-for the extensive Soviet activities in the Third World, the build up of the Soviet navy, or, in general,
the continued emphasis on developing capacities for long-distance projection of offensive military power."34 Similarly, the actual "cautious ex-

pediency" of Soviet foreign policy results from Marxist ideology, and in
any event, "Soviet support for Third World 'progressive' forces goes beyond
the counsels of caution and opportunism."35 Finnis and his co-authors
conclude that "it would be quite premature to think that Soviet officials
are at heart decent pragmatists and patriots cast in the image, or selfimage, of Western leaders and elites." 36 They think it unlikely that "the
valWestern nations would long maintain their constitutional and3social
7
ues if they were to renounce nuclear deterrence unilaterally.

9Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.
30
31

Id.

32

33

Id.

Id. at 71.
4Id.

35

36
17

Id.

Id. at 72.

Id. at 73-74.
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This theme unsurprisingly recurs throughout the book. The authors
refer to "subsequent Soviet domination of other nations," and "the enslavement of many millions of persons [which] refers to no mere abstraction; those subjected to totalitarian oppression are inhibited from living
good lives, pressed to do wicked things, and very often deprived of life,
liberty, and many other important goods," and they say that "one should
bear in mind the grave risks created by movements which, while advocating nuclear disarmament, fail to acknowledge, steadily and clearly,
what would be the probable side-effect of doing what they advocate: Soviet
domination." 38 These are, to my mind, extraordinary words read in 1990,
and striking words to have written in 1987. For about twenty years, the
Soviet economy has been staggering along, and there is surely little reason to think that the rulers of the Soviet Union, no matter what their
Leninist ideology, such as it is, would say, would be enthusiastic about
taking on the burdens of governing-"enslaving"-a recalcitrant population of the United States. Nor does there seem to me much evidence of
Soviet foreign policy adventurism in the past twenty years on the questions of nuclear strategy that most concern Finnis and his co-authors;
the citations of support for Third World revolutions seem to me almost
completely irrelevant to the question of the expansionist desires vis-avis Western democracies of the Soviet leadership. And, finally, there is
the point that negotiations over nuclear disarmament, again over the
past twenty years, have repeatedly consisted of the United States refusing
to take "yes" for an answer, saying that technological developments make
it inappropriate now to adopt proposals that the United States had made
3
in the recent past.

9

What can account for the myopia reflected in Finnis's discussion of the
likelihood of Soviet world domination? I am willing to put some weight
on the authors' understandable lack of prescience about developments in
the Soviet Union, though I again have to stress that the book was published in 1987 and describes ordinary life under Soviet rule as if Stalin
was still in charge. Another aspect of the explanation seems to me to lie
in the authors' larger conceptual program, which involves using the question of nuclear strategy to challenge both consequentialist and standard
deontological arguments about the foundations of morality with an alternative drawn from what Finnis calls "the tradition of the common
morality." Particularly with respect to consequentialism, the case for
unilateral disarmament based on "the common morality" might well be
uninteresting unless the consequences were presented as extremely severe. If the consequences are not that severe, ordinary consequentialist
calculations might lead to adoption of a unilaterist policy, which would
accord with Finnis's preferences but for reasons quite inconsistent with
his deepest commitments.
38Id. at 158, 241, 353-54.

391 should also mention the use in domestic United States politics of the specter

of a "missile gap" and a "window of vulnerability" (the former by a Democratic
candidate for the Presidency, the latter by a Republican one), neither of which
turned out to exist once the candidate took office.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss1/10
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But, there seems to be more to it than that sort of intellectual strategy.
The language Finnis and his co-authors use conveys, both in the kinds
of key statements I have quoted and in their more passing comments,
real belief in the picture of the likelihood of Soviet domination. A recent
book on the way in which nuclear strategists think about their enterprise
illuminates, in my view, that belief. According to Steven Kull, nuclear
strategists carry around in their heads two completely incompatible understandings of nuclear arms. On one understanding, nuclear arms are
just a development of conventional weaponry and nuclear strategy is an
extension of conventional strategy. On the other understanding, nuclear
arms are quite different from conventional weapons, particularly in that
they make possible a strategy of"sufficiency"-enough weapons to destroy
the enemy even after being subjected to a first strike-rather than equivalency-the same numbers and types of weapons as the enemy has, because each weapon can "take out" only its equivalent. Kull bases his
analysis on interviews with nuclear strategists. He reports one of them
as follows:
He [said] that it is also important to have a countersilo response
to a Soviet countersilo attack. If the Soviets think that the
United States could not respond in kind, they might think the
United States would not respond. He agreed that even without
hard-target kill capability, the United States would have many
options for striking military targets-just not hardened ones.
I then asked why the Soviets would think we might not respond.
He answered that they "might" think this way and we must
guard against this possibility. When asked if he would see
things this way if he were in Soviet shoes, he equivocated but
then basically said no. When I probed into why he attributed
such reasoning to the Soviets, he did not offer any supportive
evidence but shrugged and said that "we might as well" guard
°
against this possibility and "there's no reason not to.""
To an outsider, this looks completely irrational, and indeed that sense
comes across throughout Kull's work. Policymakers say incompatible
things, and when confronted with the incompatibility adopt a variety of
rhetorical strategies that shift the ground to yet another unsatisfactory
position, only to end up saying the equivalent of "we might as well." Kull
attributes this irrationality, as it seems to me, to psychological processes.
That is not my concern here. Rather, I want to link my discussion of
Finnis on nuclear strategy to my discussion of the embeddedness of lawyers' practical reason. The link occurs, I suggest, in the fact that, in some
sense, Finnis and his co-authors have to talk in the way they do about
Soviet intentions and the like if they are to be taken seriously by the
group concerned with the issue, that is, by nuclear policymakers. They
are, in short, embedded in a social group with a distinctive outlook on
the world, and to get off the ground in a discussion with that group one
40 S. KULL, MINDS AT WAR: NUCLEAR REALITY AND THE INNER CONFLICTS OF
DEFENSE POLICYMAKERS 180-81 (1989).
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has to at least act as if the group's assumptions are obviously correct,
and probably has to truly believe that they are. In just the same way are
lawyers embedded in an array of social relations that defines the limits
of what they can regard as results compatible with practical reason.
Although I am not deeply familiar with the tradition in which the
concept of practical reason plays a central part, I can imagine a response
to these cynical sociological observations about the legal profession (and
nuclear policymaking) in the United States. The observations might be
correct, the response I imagine would go, but they are irrelevant to a
proper understanding of practical reason. Such a concept, it might be
thought, can be developed only by considering what a "purified" practical
activity would be, that is, one that lacked the distortions of judgment
that the sociological observations have identified. 41 This response, I take
it, links Finnis's analysis to the tradition in which he is working, where
practical reason is theoretical reasoning about the connection between
means and ends.
Within that tradition, the objections I have raised may be irrelevant.
Yet, as the notion of "practical reason" has been assimilated into United
States legal theory, a difficulty remains. In the process of assimilation
"practical reason" has come to be opposed to "abstract reasoning," and
has come to be connected to the idea of "pragmatic reasoning." With the
tradition assimilated in that way, the difficulty remains. Relying on a
purified profession effectively abandons the idea of "practical reason," in
the sense in which the concept has been assimilated into United States
legal theory, as something embodied in, though of course going beyond,
real practices. If we must imagine a purified profession in order to understand what that sort of practical reason is, we are, or so it seems to
me, engaged in the kinds of abstract reasoning to which United States
legal theorists think the tradition of practical reason is opposed, at least
with respect to the kinds of activity to which practical rather than theoretical reason was appropriate.
My ignorance of the relevant tradition means, of course, that I may be
completely off the mark. Before considering the significance of that ignorance in a somewhat different way, however, I would still insist on the
accuracy of my sociological observation that the idea of practical reason
is likely to be assimilated into the United States legal profession in the
form of a complacent acceptance of things pretty much as they are, modified, of course, in a sensibly moderate way. Because moderate reform in
the United States seems to resemble the programs of the non-Thatcherite
Conservative "wets" in Great Britain, I do not take much comfort in the
recent interest in practical reason among United States legal academics. 42
41 1 am comforted in conjuring up this response by the fact
that Jurgen Habermas, who does rely on some idea of practical reason, has offered a response of
the sort I am imagining. And, Finnis's treatment of emotion as distorting practical
judgment seems to me also relevant here.
41Habermas has noted, as well, the importance of developing an idea of practical reason that avoids becoming "just a reflection of the prejudices of the adult,
white, well-educated, western male of today." Habermas, Morality and Ethical

Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, 83 Nw. U.L. REV.

38, 40 (1989).
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In concluding this section, I would like to revert to Finnis's discussion of
nuclear deterrence. For me, even though I come from a different tradition,
clearly the most powerful portion of the book is its final section, "Concluding Christian Thoughts." That section more credibly presents the
unilateralist argument than the remainder of the book. It is suggestive
of the way in which social relations limit what counts as an exercise of
in their Prepractical reason that Finnis and his co-authors tell 4readers
3
to.
want
they
if
section
this
skip
face that they can
III. TRADITIONS AND LEGAL REASONING
As one who finds the critical legal studies approach to law congenial,
I have been struck, amused almost, by the kinds of criticisms levelled
against the works of Roberto Unger by certain British scholars, among
them Finnis.44 These scholars apply the standard techniques of philosophical analysis in the central Anglo-American tradition to Unger's
work, and find it wanting. Yet, one might think that they have committed
what they might describe as a category mistake. When I read Unger, I
am struck by the distance between his work and most contemporary
political philosophy in the United States. I have found it easiest to think
of Unger as jurisprudence's Gabriel Garcia Marquez. The analogy is helpful in this context because Marquez is a magical realist, which means
that, because he is a realist, there is some connection between the world
he writes about and the world we live in. Similarly, Unger writes something that has some connection with mainstream political philosophy.
Yet, using the standard techniques I have referred to as the basis for
criticizing Unger's work seems to me like criticizing Marquez's magic
realism on the ground that no one really lives for hundreds of years.
One might respond that it is not Unger's critics but Unger himself who
has committed the category mistake. Marquez, after all, calls his works
novels. Unger, in contrast, appears to be talking to practitioners of philosophy in the United States. He makes general claims about language,
truth, and reason that look much like philosophy as they conceive it.
Further, one might wonder what sort of response Unger wishes to elicit
from his readers. If he wants them to give rational assent to the propositions he offers, surely, his critics would say, his arguments must be
subjected to the kinds of rational analysis they have deployed. I agree
with that point, and confess that I would be much more comfortable were
I able to say that, having read the critics, I continue to give my rational
assent to Unger's arguments. Perhaps because of my limitations as an
analyst, however, I find myself largely persuaded by Finnis's criticism of
Unger. 45 Yet, Unger still seems right to me in an important way. This
41J. FINNIS, J. BOYLE, & G. GRISEZ, supra note 27, at vi ("A reader concerned

simply with common morality's implications for deterrence need read only Parts
One, Two, and Five, which stand independently of... the concluding reflections
in Part Six").
See Finnis, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 30 AM. J. JuRIs. 21 (1985);
Ewald, Unger'sLegal Philosophy:A CriticalLegal Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665 (1988).
45Though not by Ewald's.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990

13

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:137

suggests that, at least insofar as I am unable to counter Unger's critics,
I must believe that Unger seeks something other than rational assentperhaps, as the analogy to Marquez suggests, esthetic appreciation of his
having captured something about the world in which we live.
I mention the possibility of a category mistake because I think it has
some bearing on Finnis's natural law enterprise. At first glance, Finnis
seems to draw extraordinarily strong and obviously controversial conclusions from extremely weak premises.46 Further, again at first glance there
seems to be some tension between Finnis's invocation of practical reason,
which would appear to call upon judgments socialized professionals make
in the course of dealing with particular problems that present themselves
in enormous detail in their professional lives, and his acceptance of rather
quick abstract arguments from those weak premises to his strong conclusions.
These difficulties, though, disappear when we understand that Finnis
operates from within a particular philosophical tradition, whose aspiration is, in part, to demonstrate that relatively abstract arguments are
rationally grounded in understandings we gain from practical reason.
Those of us outside that tradition might raise our eyebrows at the tradition's continued adherence to that project, which has been offering itself
for rational agreement for almost a thousand years and which appears,
at best, to have run up against impenetrable barriers in the past two
hundred years. Yet, of course, two hundred years is a relatively short
period of time, as these things go, as indeed is a thousand years. Outsiders'
skepticism therefore need not cast any rational doubt on the insiders'
project.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to be, if not skeptical in the sense I have
just suggested, somewhat distanced from Finnis's project. These reasons
are suggested by the category mistake committed in the criticisms of
Unger's work. The mistake there is to assess work within a particular
tradition according to the criteria used in another tradition. So too with
Finnis's project: Precisely because it is located within a particular tradition, outsiders to that tradition really cannot get a proper handle on it
for purposes of criticizing or even evaluating it. For those outside the
tradition, his work can be edifying, illuminating some aspects of what
we see in the world without, however, commanding our rational agreement-just as Marquez's magical realism can illuminate the real world
without being realistic according to the criteria most of us use in our
daily lives, and just as Unger's jurisprudence can be illuminating without
satisfying the demands of the central tradition of recent Anglo-American
political philosophy.47
"See Shearmur, Natural Law Without Metaphysics?: The Case of John Finnis,
38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 123 (1990).
41 A. MACiNTYRE, supra note 16, concludes with an argument that discussions
across traditions can be more than merely edifying but can, in some circumstances
at least, result in the rational replacement of one tradition by another. His analysis deserves much more extended treatment than this footnote, but in the present
context I should note that I find his argument fundamentally inconsistent with
the entire structure of his argument elsewhere in the book.
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In that spirit, I would like to conclude with one observation about
Finnis's presentation in this Symposium. As Finnis presents his natural
law theory, immorality, at least in its "paradigmatic form," involves the
emotional distortion ofjudgment. Evil, that is, is, or is at least connected
to, "bad emotion." There are other traditions, though, in which evil and
bad emotion play rather different roles. For those who find Freud's insights into human personality illuminating, bad emotion is an ineradicable part of personality, which can be brought under control, if at all,
only to a degree. In that tradition, Finnis's hopeful assumption that bad
appears
emotion can be placed under the full 48control of rationality, which
49
to be an essentially unalloyed good,

is mere romanticism.

Alternatively, of course, we might see evil as ineradicable. That appears
to have been Dostoyevsky's view, for example, to invoke a figure who is,
in the broadest sense, within the same tradition as Finnis. If, as in my
tradition, one does not believe in God's redemptive grace, one is likely to
be even more cautious about accepting the view offered by Finnis that
practical reason, refined through rationality purged of bad emotion, will
justify fairly precise conclusions about controversial moral issues. We
will, of course, have to do the best we can, but, alas, the best we can do
may be quite limited.

my skepticism about the assumption that rationality is necessarily good,
see Tushnet, Flourishing and the Problem of Evil, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1631, 1647
(1989).
49See, e.g., H. MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION (1956).
8 For
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